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Abstract
This paper uses the second phase of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey to investigate the changes
in expenditure inequality and instability in Russia between the autumn of 1994 and the autumn of 1998.
The expenditure distribution is stable in spite of the economic and political turmoil Russia is going through.
However, that does not imply much economic stability.  Households’ expenditure fluctuated considerably,
with over 60 percent of the population’s expenditure either more than doubling or falling to less than half
their previous levels.  Only about 10 percent of all households experienced an expenditure shock of less
than 10 percent.  The measured level of expenditure mobility is very high.  This raises the question whether
the observed mobility is in fact the expenditure instability.  Distinguishing between the two is crucial for
policy makers.  While the mobility is often viewed as favorable, the high instability may affect the
incentives of Russians to support the economic reforms, acquire human capital, and undertake
entrepreneurial activities.
___________________________________
* I would like to thank Finis Welch, Donald Deere, Michael Lokshin, Erzo Luttmer, Wayne Strayer, and
the participants of the Private Enterprise Research Center Applied Economics Seminar and The World
Bank Inequality Seminar for their valuable comments and suggestions.2
Non-technical summary:
This paper investigates the changes in expenditure inequality and instability between of 1994 and
of 1998, using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey.  Although the expenditure
distribution has remained stable in spite of the economic and political turmoil Russia has been
going through, the individual household’s expenditure has been quite unstable.  The measured
level of expenditure mobility is very high, suggesting that expenditure instability is also high.
While mobility is often viewed as favorable, high instability may affect the incentives of Russians
to support economic reforms, to acquire human capital, and to undertake entrepreneurial
activities.
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There is little doubt that the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy in
Russia affected the lives of many.  It was recognized early on that privatization could benefit
certain people more than others, and that macro-economic adjustments would be borne more
heavily by some groups (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992).  This raises a number of questions:
how did the transition affect inequality; were households and individuals able to take advantage
of new opportunities; who was left behind?  This paper looks into inequality and mobility in
Russia in years following the advent of the transition.  The data used in this paper span the time
period from the fall of 1994 to the fall of 1998, when the initial effects of the 1992 privatization
and price liberalization are likely to have faded and the market economy had a chance to take
root.
I find that the emergence of a market economy in Russia does not imply high inequality levels.
After an initial increase in inequality, the trend of increasing inequality, measured in terms of
household expenditure, slowed and even reversed between the fall of 1994 and the fall of 1998.
Although the household expenditure distribution changed its shape only modestly, the position of
the households in the expenditure distribution changed dramatically.  Households experienced
considerable fluctuations in their expenditure, with over 60 percent of the population’s
expenditure either more than doubling or falling to less than half their previous levels.  While
such high fluctuations may indicate that even in Russia there is a chance for an American dream,
it may as well be a sign of a high instability.  The high instability may affect the incentives of
Russians, who seem to be caught in the game of Russian roulette, to support the economic
reforms, acquire human capital, and undertake entrepreneurial activities.
This paper is organized in five sections.  The first section offers a brief literature review. The
following section discusses the data and main welfare indicators I used.  Section three provides an4
overview of the levels and changes observed in equivalent household expenditure.  Section four
examines the issue of household mobility (instability) within the expenditure distribution.
Section five concludes.
1.  Previous Contributions
Although some level of inequality existed prior to the economic reforms, income distributions in
communist countries were among the most equal in the world (Milanovic, 1998).  Milanovic
(1999) attributes the increase in inequality to changes in composition of employment - the state-
sector middle class moves into either the ‘rich’ private sector or the ‘poor’ unemployed sector.
Ferreira (1997) lists privatization of public assets, development of new markets for privately
provided substitutes to public services, and changes in the returns on different skills as the main
reasons for the observed increase in inequality.
The increase in inequality during the first years of transition is well documented.  While most of
the literature deals with income and wage inequality, recent contributions investigate household
consumption inequality and dynamics.  Flemming and Micklewright (1997) reported that the
wage decile ratio tripled in only three years, increasing from 3.3 in 1992 to 10 in 1995.  Based on
official statistics, the Gini coefficient for the Russian wage bill increased from 0.22 in 1989 to 0.5
in 1996.  Findings based on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) suggest that
the rise in wage inequality for full-time workers measured by the Gini coefficient and the decile
ratio was even greater, with the former measure increasing from 0.42 in 1992 to 0.51 in 1996, and
the latter increasing from 7 to 13 during the same period (Yemtsov and Lokshin, 1999).  While it
is evident that the increase in inequality was substantial, few attempts have been made to measure
the precision of these numbers.  The majority of studies utilized cross sectional data for their5
inquiry which do not distinguish between permanent changes in well-being and transitory shocks
to which some of the reported increases in inequality may be attributed.
Two recent papers use the RLMS panel to address the question of expenditure inequality.  Both
papers address the large fluctuations in expenditure in Russia.  Giles (2000) reports real per capita
consumption became more unequal between 1994 and 1996, but that measured inequality fell
substantially between 1996 and 1998.  Giles investigates the correlation between the external
aggregate shocks to the household and per-capita household consumption, and finds that the
consumption of the households with household head employed in the private sector is not as
correlated with the aggregate shock as the consumption of the households with a head employed
in the state or employee-owned firms.  Luttmer (2000) demonstrates that accounting for noise in
the data significantly reduces the measures inequality.  While individuals face much uncertainty,
half of these fluctuations in expenditure reflect transitory shocks or measurement error.  The
contribution of this paper to the ongoing debate on the dynamics of inequality in Russia is an
emphasis on the mobility and instability of expenditures among Russian households.  The results
suggest that the level of instability in economic well-being, measured by household expenditure,
is very high, and cannot be explained by characteristics of the household.
2.  Data
The data for this study come from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS)
1.  The
RLMS is the first nationally representative random sample for Russia.  The RLMS has been
carried out in two phases, with each phase based on a separate nationally representative sample of
                                                          
1 The issues related to sample design and data collection are described in great detail on the North Carolina
population center web page (www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/rlms_home.html), and in the Zohoori, N., et
al. 1998 article.  Phase I consists of surveys conducted in September 1992 (Round 1), February 1993
(Round 2), August 1993 (Round 3), and November 1993 (Round 4), while Phase II consists of surveys in
December 1994 (Round 5), October 1995 (Round 6), October 1996 (Round 7), and November 1998
(Round 8).6
the Russian population.  This paper uses rounds 5 through 8 from Phase II of RLMS.  The
individual rounds sampled 3,763 households in 1994, 3,560 in 1995, 3,562 in 1996, and 3,622
households in 1998.  This yields a sample of 2,390 households present in all four rounds.  The
analysis is performed on the individual rounds as well as on the sample restricted to households
interviewed in all four rounds (hence forth referred to as balanced panel).  In addition to the
household characteristics, I use the demographic and labor market characteristics of the
household heads.  All monetary variables are expressed in 1992 prices.  The monthly Consumer
Price Index reported by the Russian Economic Trends (RET), published by Stockholm Institute of
Transition Economics and East European Economies serves for comparing prices.  Although the
difference in regional prices was present, a reliable regional monthly CPI is not available.
The main measure of economic well-being used in this paper is the logarithm of real monthly
consumption expenditure excluding expenditure on durable goods but including that on home
production.  The expenditure is adjusted for household size using an equivalence scale
2 of 0.75.
The focus on household expenditure is only partly due to the notion that household expenditure is
a better proxy for household resources than income and wages.  The turbulent times in Russia
during the period covered with the data increased the importance of informal economic activities
and income from these activities is unlikely to be reported truthfully
3.  Income from wages
constitutes only a third of the total household income in all four years.  Further, there has been a
remarkable expansion of wage arrears: the share of workers affected increased from over 10
                                                                                                                                                                            
2 The adult equivalent expenditure is defined as 
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which value of theta one should use.  Milanovic and Jovanovic (1999) estimate the theta to be 0.62, close to
the value of 0.5 reported by Frijters and van Praag (1994) and 0.42 reported by Ravallion and Lokshin
(1996).  The analysis was repeated for per capita household expenditure (theta equal to one), and the results
did not differ in any significant way.
3 The household income in all four rounds was only 75 percent of household expenditure, which points to
the possibility that the household income was under-reported.7
percent in 1993 to over 60 percent in 1998, with only 25 percent of the working population
receiving their full wages on time (Yemtsov and Lokshin, 1999.)
The expenditure survey was part of the RLMS household questionnaire, which includes
information about the purchases of a specific good, the quantity of the purchase, and the amount
paid.  The reference period is different for different categories of goods:  For food expenditure,
the reference period was one week prior to the survey; for services and utilities it is one month
prior to the survey; and for shoes and clothes, and durable goods and home production it is three
months prior to the survey.  Assuming that the expenditure is uniformly distributed throughout
the reference period, total expenditure was calculated by a summation of all the categories, and
using the appropriate weights (4.2 for food expenditure, and 0.33 for durables, shoes and clothes.)
Table 1:  Shares of Expenditure Categories
Year Food Home pr. Services Durables Luxuries Other
1994 0.522 0.164 0.054 0.027 0.016 0.217
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
1995 0.536 0.143 0.082 0.015 0.010 0.213
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
1996 0.525 0.128 0.085 0.018 0.011 0.233
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
1998 0.474 0.188 0.093 0.012 0.011 0.223
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Category “Other goods” includes clothes, shoes, fuel engine, and different categories of payments (medical
expenses, child care, travel, insurance, purchase of valuable papers, alimony, credits, debts and loans, and
travel).
The share of expenditure categories is given in the Table 1.  Given the economic situation in the
country, in particular the reemergence of high inflation, it would be reasonable to expect that the
households increased the purchase of durable goods in order to store the value of their incomes
and smooth their consumption
4.  Table 1, however, does not offer much support to that
hypothesis.  The share of durables fell by 15 percentage points between 1994 and 1998.  The
                                                          
4 As an alternative, Russian households may have attempted to store the values of their incomes by purchasing foreign
currency.  However, the data on foreign currency holdings is not available.8
share of categories other than durables appears to be roughly stable between 1994 and 1996.
Between 1996 and 1998 however, share of food decreases by over 5 and durables by 5 percentage
points, the share of home production increased by 6 points.  Expenditure on services marked a
modest one-percentage point increase, while the share of luxuries remained stable in the same
period.
As in any panel data set, the RLMS suffers from the pitfalls of sample attrition.  The University
of North Carolina website reports that households with better economic positions and households
in urban areas are more likely to drop out of the sample.  The basic characteristics of the
households and household heads for the balanced panel (households present in all four rounds)
and for individual rounds are presented in Table A1 in the appendix.
The attrition rate is high, over 32 % of the households who are present on three or less individual
rounds are not in the balanced panel.  Households from the early rounds that were not present in
the same dwelling in the later rounds were not followed, which explains the high attrition rates in
the first two rounds.  The panel has been replenished in rounds seven and eight, which accounts
for the high attrition in the last two rounds.  At the same time, households that were not in the
earlier rounds, but were living at the address of the household that was in the sample are simply
added to the sample.  Comparing only the last two rounds of the RLMS, Ravallion and Lokshin
(2000) report that the households that were re-interviewed in 1998 tended to have slightly higher
expenditure per-equivalent-adult in 1996, more household members, and were more likely to
reside in rural areas.  They speculate that the attrition may be non-random in a sense that the
poorest households are the one leaving the sample.
A simple comparison between the household characteristics for the balanced sample and the
individual rounds indicates that the households from Moscow and St. Petersburg are indeed more9
likely to leave the sample.  The share of household heads with higher education is significantly
higher in the individual rounds.  If the attrition is non-random, the results obtained using the
balanced sample may be biased.  In particular, if the households with better economic position are
leaving the sample, the right tail of the expenditure distribution is likely to be underestimated.
For that reason the next section of this paper, which assesses the changes in the expenditure
distribution, uses both individual rounds and the balanced panel.
3.  Expenditure Distribution and Shocks
Based on the economic situation in Russia during the period covered by the data, one would
expect that household welfare was depreciating at a relatively stable rate prior to the crisis, and
decreased significantly in the fall of 1998.  Adult equivalent household expenditure decreased by
more than 17 percent annually between 1994 and 1996.  In 1998, expenditure contracted by
almost 30 percent.  Between the fall of 1994 and fall of 1998, the mean (and median) expenditure
dropped by about 64 percent.  This decrease of the mean log equivalent adult household
expenditure (LEAHE) is depicted in Figure 1, which plots distribution of the log equivalent adult
expenditure in 1994 through 1998.
Figure 2 plots the expenditure distribution centered at zero.  It appears that in spite of the sharp
decline in mean expenditure, the shape of the distribution changed modestly.  Table 2 reports the
mean, median, log mean and variance, Gini coefficient, and major percentile ratios for real
equivalent expenditure for individual rounds and balanced panel (Table A2 in Appendix reports
the statistics for the Per Capita Equivalent Household Expenditure as a part of sensitivity study).
In order to add measures of precision, the bootstrapping method is used to compute the
corresponding standard errors. These standard errors may be understated as the estimation
technique ignores the sample clusters.  Nevertheless, with due caution these standard errors can
provide a good idea on the accuracy of the estimates.10
Figure 1: Probability Density Kernel Estimates of the LEAHE
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Figure 2: Probability Density Kernel Estimates of the LEAHE centered at zero
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Using Lorenz curves to compare the distributions, we find that the distribution of LEAHE
exhibits greater inequality than in 1994, with the curve for 1995 below the curve for 1994.  The
distribution of LEAHE for 1996 (1998) is more equal than the one for 1995 (1996).  Finally,
comparing the beginning and the end of the period we cannot say with certainty which11
distribution carries more inequality since the Lorenz curves cross
5.  Based on the individual
rounds, the Gini coefficient suggested that inequality remained roughly the same between 1994
and 1998.  Gini coefficient increased from 0.48 to 0.49.  There has been movement of the 10
th and
the 90
th percentile relative to the median.  Between 1994 and 1998 both the left and right tail of
the distribution became more prominent, with more spread in the left tail.  Focusing only on the
beginning and the end of the period, the 75
th and 25
th percentiles relative to the median remained
remarkably stable given the severity of the financial crisis that occurred in the fall of 1998, only a
few of months before the data was collected.
Table 2:  Distribution of the Equivalent Adult Household Expenditure
Year Mean Median Lg Mean Lg Var. Gini 90th-10th 50th-10th 90th-50th 75th-50th 50th-25th
94 4934.52 3368.97 8.11 0.74 0.47 7.62 2.87 2.65 1.66 1.68
(112.11) (53.55) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.27) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
95 4158.96 2903.03 7.96 0.71 0.46 7.47 2.78 2.69 1.62 1.65
(94.38) (50.42) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.32) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
96 3634.55 2489.74 7.80 0.80 0.47 8.56 3.00 2.85 1.67 1.70
(89.98) (41.27) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.29) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
98 2769.38 1872.19 7.51 0.78 0.48 8.03 2.93 2.74 1.69 1.72
(78.02) (36.84) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.32) (0.09) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
94 4681.74 3334.84 8.09 0.69 0.44 7.12 2.73 2.61 1.63 1.65
(161.02) (78.25) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.24) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
95 3954.25 2810.01 7.94 0.64 0.44 7.01 2.67 2.62 1.61 1.62
(102.29) (56.44) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.30) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
96 3403.10 2429.65 7.76 0.75 0.45 8.09 2.99 2.71 1.64 1.69
(92.53) (45.35) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.36) (0.08) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03)
98 2510.57 1803.77 7.47 0.71 0.44 7.63 2.84 2.69 1.66 1.68
(58.63) (34.59) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.33) (0.10) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
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Standard errors in parenthesis.
Since the remaining discussion in this paper relies on the household in all four rounds of the
RLMS, it is important to understand how does the attrition affect the results.  The results based on
the balanced sample show lower inequality, with Gini coefficient of 0.44 at the beginning and at
                                                          
5 Lorenz curves are plotted in Figure A1 in the Appendix.  It is very hard to eyeball whether distributions
actually cross or not, since all the curves are very close to one another.  In order to check if one cure is
above (under) the other, I subtract the share of expenditures for each population percentile (vertical
distance between the two curves).12
the end of the period, while the log variance shows a very modest increase in inequality
6.  Both
tails of the distribution are more prominent in individual rounds than in the balanced panel, but
the 90
th to 10
th decile ratio is especially underestimated when using the balanced panel.  In 1998,
the ratio was 8.03 when using individual rounds and only 7.3 in the balanced panel.  Figure A2
plots the probability density kernel estimates for each individual year for the balanced panel and
individual rounds.
Even though the expenditure distribution appears to be stable, the changes in equivalent
expenditure at the household level are quite dramatic.  Table 3 shows the percentage change in
measured equivalent household expenditure between the reference month and the identical month
one year later
7.  The percentage changes are expressed in terms of the deviations from the
national mean.  The reference month for Russia is November or December 1994.  Households
experienced considerable fluctuations in their expenditure, with over 60 percent of the
population’s expenditure either more than doubling or falling to less than half their previous
levels.  Only about 10 percent of all households experienced an expenditure shock of less than 10
percent.
As Ferreira (1997) suggested, individual’s skills and use of certain public services should be able
to predict (the direction of) if the individual is likely to improve or lose his economic status.  In
order to show if the fortunes of the household were related to their demographic characteristics
and individual characteristics of the household heads, a regression of year-to-year change in the
log real equivalent expenditure on a set of dummy variables depicting the characteristics of the
                                                          
6 Although these findings may appear contradictory, different inequality measures are more sensitive to
inequality in different parts of the distribution.  If inequality in one part of the distribution (say the bottom
tail) increases while it decreases elsewhere (say the top tail), it is quite possible for different inequality
statistics to give different results.
7 The actual distribution is calculated in logs, and then translated into percentage change.  The log shock
distribution plot is given in Figures A3a and A3b in Appendix.13
household and household’s decile position in 1994 (the reference year) is used.  Following
Ferreira’s context, education of the household head is used as a proxy for skill, while a group of
regional and settlement type dummy variables serve as proxies for access to public services.  The
decile position in reference year is included to account for the fact that those in the left tail of the
distribution are more likely to experience gains, while those in the right tail are more prone to
losses.  The results for the 1996 to 1998 difference are added, since these results have potential to
shed light on the characteristics of the households that might have caused gains or losses after the
1998 crisis.  The results of this exercise are given in the Appendix (Table A3).
Table 3:  Percentage change of the EAHE
% change Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
-67 - 193 8.08 204 8.53 214 8.96 240 10.04 237 9.92
-33 to -67 490 20.5 469 19.63 516 21.59 457 19.13 509 21.3
-10 to -33 347 14.51 363 15.19 328 13.73 364 15.23 305 12.76
-10 to 10 281 11.76 233 9.75 246 10.29 255 10.67 236 9.88
10 to 25 167 6.99 181 7.57 173 7.24 150 6.28 153 6.4
25 to 50 205 8.58 235 9.83 209 8.74 184 7.7 205 8.58
50 to 100 293 12.26 319 13.35 238 9.96 265 11.09 253 10.59
100+ 414 17.32 386 16.14 466 19.5 475 19.88 492 20.58
Log mean 
94-98
-0.171 -0.176 -0.291 -0.347 -0.637
94-95 95-96 96-98 94-96
There appears to be some evidence in support of Fereira’s proposition that individual skills are a
good predictor of the change in economic status during the transition.  The only individual
characteristic significant in all regression equations is a dummy variable for whether the
household head obtained higher education.  Households with a highly educated household head
experienced gains compared to those headed by a head with inferior education.  The age of the
household head, as well as the household composition, is not significant.  Households that did not
reside in metropolitan areas (Moscow and St. Petersburg) experienced higher losses when
compared to Moscow and St. Petersburg residents, suggesting that residents of metropolitan areas14
have better access to public services.  Regional dummies are significant (all but Ural in the last
specification) at the 10 percent confidence level.  This, however, does not imply that the
demographic characteristics of the household explain much of the change in expenditure.  As we
shall see, the regression to the mean is the main force behind the results.  Once the decile position
in the reference year is accounted for, the explanatory power of the demographic characteristics is
very low.  The variation in household characteristics explains less than 4 percent of the variation
in the estimated residuals from regression of year-to-year change on decile position in the
reference year.
Although these fluctuations in economic fortunes appear to be enormous, many of these changes
might reflect transitory events that do not affect underlying well-being.  Moreover, much of the
fluctuation may not reflect real events but simply measurement error in the data.  Luttmer (2000)
reports large temporary shocks in the Russian economy.  Luttmer used a model that describes the
expenditure as a sum of an underlying level (which evolves subject to a common trend and a
persistent shock) and a transitory shock.  The persistent shock is persistent in the sense that it
persists for at least two periods.  This model allows for decomposition of the change of the
expenditure (expenditure “shock”) on persistent and transitory shocks.  Using the same data set
used in this paper, Luttmer estimates the transitory shock to constitute 86 percent of the total
shock in expenditure, and 90 percent in income.  For example, a Russian household who once
earned 2,000 Rubles per month and whose income increased to 3,000 Rubles in the current month
should expect their income to fall back to 2,100 Rubles in the same month one year later.  Only
10 percent of the shock will persist, while the remaining 90 percent of the gain will disappear.15
4.  Expenditure Instability
This section concerns itself with changes in households’ position in the adult equivalent
expenditure distribution over time.  Even though the stability of the expenditure distribution may
suggest the overall levels of well-being were maintained over the four years covered with the
survey, it may also mask significant movements of individual households within the distribution.
As demonstrated above, the changes in the expenditure level over the period were quite dramatic.
The question is whether these changes are implying high levels of expenditure mobility or
expenditure instability.
Most of the literature uses the data from the developed economies to address issues of mobility
within the distribution, and are based upon the premise that income is a measure of well-being.
In a developed economy with competitive and dynamic labor market and established social safety
nets, movement within the distribution is viewed as favorable sign of mobility.  In a country with
little stability in any aspect of political and economic life, the same movements can be viewed as
a sign of instability, especially if they are large and appear to be random.  A high level of
instability in economic well-being can generate potential political behavior that weakens the
government’s commitment to promote the economic reforms.
I will assess the movement of households within the expenditure distribution using several
different approaches. First, I will use the method described by Welch (1999) to construct adjacent
year changes in the percentile of the expenditure distribution.   The second approach decomposes
the variation in the expenditure into permanent and transitory components, and uses the share of
the permanent component in total variation as a mobility–instability-measure.  The third way is to
compute Shorrock’s Index R for the four different measures of inequality (Gini coefficient,
Square of Coefficient of Variation, Theil Index, and Theil Entropy Index), and see how it changes
as we extend the accounting period.  Finally, the changes of households’ position in the16
expenditure distribution are analyzed using transition matrices.  In this part of the paper only the
balanced panel will be used, since it is essential to observe households at multiple points in time.
4.1 Adjacent year changes
This approach enables us to see how, on average, the percentile position of the household
changed over time, and what are average percentile gains and losses.  Each household is assigned
its percentile value in each year.  Taking 1995 as the base year, at each percentile of the base
year, I calculate the average percentile position in the previous and succeeding year for all
households and average the results for a series of triplets (Figure 3).  Among those in the 10
th
percentile in 1995, the expected loss from 1994 to 1995 is roughly 20 percentile points, meaning
that in 1994 these households were, on average, in the approximately 30
th percentile.  These
households (in the 10
th percentile) are expected to gain 20 percentage points in 1996, thus finding
themselves in the 30
th percentile of household expenditure.  Similarly, households located at the
90
th percentile in 1995 on average experienced almost a 20 percentile points gain compared to the
previous year, and are expected to lose 20 percentile points in the succeeding year.  On average,
the richer are getting poorer, and poorer are getting richer.  These averages, however, may be
misleading.  Although the adjacent year changes are exhibiting the expected regression to the
mean feature, the changes in percentile positions indicate very high levels of expenditure
instability.  Some of the changes in household’s position can be attributed to transitory events, or
alternatively, to very noisy data.
4.2 The share of permanent in total variation
Gittlerman and Joyce (1996) use the share of permanent in total variation (correlation coefficient
ρ ) as a mobility (instability) measure.  A low positive correlation coefficient implies that
households experienced substantial changes in their relative positions within a given expenditure
distribution, and can be viewed as evidence of a high degree of short-term expenditure instability.17
Households may have a difficult time attempting to maintain their economic status.  On the other
hand, as Gittlerman and Joyce point out, the low correlation coefficient may also be interpreted as
an indicator of high expenditure mobility, which may be viewed as favorable because it connotes
the opportunity to change one’s relative economic position.
Figure 3:  Adjacent Year Changes in LEAHE
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In order to isolate the transitory component (including measurement error) in expenditure, I use
the methodology described in Gottschalk and Moffit’s 1994 and 1995 papers.  Gottschalk and
Moffit (1994) use the simple canonical permanent-transitory model with white-noise transitory
component to investigate the growth of earnings instability in the U.S. labor market.  The model
calls upon the traditional distinction between the permanent and transitory components of a
variable.  The permanent component depicts the characteristics of the households, such as
household type and composition, labor market status of the household members and other
demographic characteristics.  The transitory component consists of the idiosyncratic part and the
possible contamination of the data due to the measurement error.  Since the idiosyncratic18
component is observationally equivalent to the measurement error, it is hard to distinguish
between the two.
Derivation of the transitory and permanent components is explained in detail in the Appendix.
The results of the decomposition above are reported in Table 4.  I find the variance of the
transitory component to account for 60.3 percent of the total variance of the log equivalent
expenditure
8.  The decomposition was also performed on three alternative definitions of the
expenditure:  total expenditure including expenditure in durable goods, food expenditure only,
and food expenditure and home production.  The share of the transitory component for food
expenditure and food expenditure with home production is higher – 67.8 and 69.3 percent
respectively.  It is clear that not accounting for transitory component leads to overstating the
measured inequality.
Table 4: Decomposition of the Equivalent Expenditure Variation
Variable Variance Permanent Transitory Tran. Share Perm. Share
Total expenditures 0.767 0.305 0.463 0.603 0.397
(0.017) (0.017) (0.007) (0.014) (0.012)
Tot. Exp. w/o durables 0.750 0.296 0.453 0.605 0.395
(0.018) (0.015) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Food Expenditures 1.060 0.341 0.719 0.678 0.322
(0.023) (0.022) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Food Exp. & Home Prod. 0.786 0.242 0.545 0.693 0.307
(0.020) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
The correlation coefficient is below 40 percent
9. The number of rounds available in the RLMS
does not allow for comparison between two sub-periods, therefore whether the degree of
instability is higher or lower than it used to be cannot be determined, and simple comparison with
                                                          
8 Gottschalk and Moffit report the transitory variance to be 34 percent of the total variation of annual income for both
1970-78 and 1979-87 sub periods.
9 Gittleman and Joyce report the mean correlation coefficient of over 70 percent for the CPS Matched earnings data.19
developed countries would not do justice to the Russian economy.  Yet, such a low value for the
correlation coefficient suggests a high expenditure instability rather than mobility.
4.3 Shorrock’s Index R
It is common to measure inequality in living standards by inequality in income or expenditure
across households in a given month (see Shorrocs, 1978 among others).  Both income and
expenditure are only imprecise measures of the living standard of a household, and could be
misreported or could reflect transitory even.  The inequality in measured income or expenditure
will exceed the inequality in underlying living standards.  Perhaps the most intuitive way to
reduce the role of transitory events and measurement error is to examine inequality in average
income and expenditure (Shorrocks, 1978).  Together with idiosyncratic components of
expenditure and measurement error, this method also averages out some true mobility –
movements in the underlying level of material well-being.  Nevertheless, the inequality of
average expenditure over several periods is likely to be a better approximation of underlying
inequality, than the one based on income in a single month.  Transitory changes in economic
well-being will imply relatively large changes as we move from one period to two period
accounting, but the consequent addition of an accounting period would not contribute to large
decreases in inequality measures   On the other hand, if the changes in permanent well-being are
taking place, the sharp decline in measured inequality will continue to take place as we extend the
accounting period.
In his 1978 and 1981 papers, Anthony Shorrocks investigated the degree to which measured
income inequality is affected by the choice of accounting period, and spells out the procedure for
assessing the correct procedure for establishing the empirical relationship between the inequality
measures and accounting period.  Shorrocks proposes using index R that measures the degree to20
which incomes are equalized as the account period is extended.  The index R takes values
between zero (compete equalization) and one (no equalization over time).
The index R compares long-run inequality and a weighted average of the annual inequality
values, with the weight proportional to the mean expenditure in each of the years.  Shorrocks
(1981) proposes the following procedure to generate the index R:  Let a population have n
households observed in m periods, and let 
k
i E denote the expenditure of the household i in period
k.  The total expenditure over the whole m-period is given by  ∑ =
k
k
i i E E , with corresponding
means  ∑ =
i
k
i
k E
n
1
µ  and  ∑∑ = =
ik
k
i E
n
µ µ
1
.  Denote the inequality value as I[E].  The
index R is computed as
[]
[]
1 <= =
∑ k
k
k Y I w
Y I
R  , where 
µ
µ
k
k w = .
In the case analyzed in this paper, there are four periods.  Beginning with the first two periods,
and then including the subsequent accounting periods (up to the total of four), values of R for
different accounting periods are obtained.  This generates a sequence {Rm}, which shows the trend
towards equalization as the accounting period is progressively lengthened.  Four different
inequality indices are used to generate the sequence {Rm}: the Gini coefficient (G), the square of
the coefficient of variation (C2), the Theil coefficient (C1), and Theil “entropy” index (C0)
10.
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The values of index R based on these indices are given in Table 5.  The indices C2, C2 and C2  are
very close, and generate almost identical sequences {Rm}, while the Gini coefficient gives quite
different sequences.  The difference between the sequences generated by C indices and the Gini
coefficient emerge because the Gini coefficient gives little weight to transfers in either tail of the
distribution, which makes it less sensitive to the accounting period (Shorrocks 1981)
Table 5: Index R for LEAHE 1994-1998
Period C 0 C 1 C 2 Gini
1994 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1994-95 0.739 0.743 0.746 0.871
1994-96 0.628 0.638 0.644 0.815
1994-98 0.571 0.583 0.590 0.783
In addition to being interpreted as an index of the stability of the inequality value to changes in
the accounting period, index R can be also interpreted as a measure of the degree to which
individual incomes fluctuate over time – a measure of expenditure mobility or instability
(Shorrocks 1981).  The idea is similar to the one described earlier where the proportion of
permanent in total variation was used as a measure of expenditure instability.  The degree of
expenditure stability can be represented with rigidity curves, where the values of index R are
plotted against the size of the accounting period.  The reference curve is the horizontal line R=1
which represents a completely immobile structure.  If the rigidity curves show a sharp initial fall,
but then remain more or less horizontal, the structure suggests transitory variations in
expenditure.  Structures are considered more egalitarian if the initial fall is not as sharp, but
decline in R continues as we extend the accounting periods.  The rigidity profiles depicted in
Figure 4 indicate that the initial drop was high, but leveled out as we add additional periods.  This
again suggests high levels of transitory variation in the expenditure, and potentially high levels of
instability.22
Figure 4:  Sequence of Index R for LEAHE 1994-1998
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4.4 Transition Matrices
Mobility is often defined as a change in household ranks within a distribution
11.  Using the RLMS
panel we are able to construct mobility tables.  Each cell in the mobility table represents the
probability pij of transferring to state j from the state i.  Therefore, the sum of the rows and
columns adds up to unity.  The states that are commonly used are quintiles or deciles of the
distribution of the well-being measures (wage, income, expenditure).  In this paper, I use the
quintiles of the expenditure distribution.  The mobility tables (transition matrices) are given in
Table 6, using the fall of 1994 as a reference.  There are two sets of tables: the first ones use the
LEAHE, while the second one uses the predicted LEAHE.  The predicted LEAHE is based on a
simple linear model (see Table A3 in Appendix), conditioned on any household or demographic
characteristics for each individual round.
It is remarkable that at the upper and lower ends, the chance of changing the rank is in fact lower
than for the middle deciles.  In the top and bottom decile, the chance of maintaining the rank is
                                                          
11 Shorrocks (1978b) proposed generating number of measures based on transition matrices that would
summarize the mobility structure and make it comparable over time and across economies, but concludes23
approximately twice the chance of maintaining the position in the middle deciles.  The main
diagonal of the transition matrices seems to be quite weak.  There is some symmetry in the
mobility table, especially for the middle deciles, where a chance of movement decreases with the
distance between the deciles.  In comparison, Gottschalk and Moffit (1995) report one-year
quintile mobility rates for log annual earnings.  Individuals in the bottom and top quintiles have a
two-thirds chance of changing their rank (33 percent for the bottom and 31 percent for the top
quintile).  Among individuals in the third quintile, 44 percent do not change their rank and about
20 percent moves to the adjacent quintile.  The remaining individuals either slide to the bottom
quintile (8 percent), or climb to the top one (7 percent).  While it is usually assumed in the
literature that the dynamic process governing transitions follows a Markov chain, a look at Table
6 reveals that the transition matrices for Russia were not generated by Markov process.
Table 6:  Transition Matrices
1234512345
1 0.45 0.23 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.72 0.18 0.06 0.03 0.01
2 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.18 0.10 0.22 0.43 0.26 0.08 0.01
3 0.17 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.13 0.05 0.31 0.38 0.21 0.05
4 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.28 0.27 0.01 0.07 0.26 0.49 0.17
5 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.19 0.76
1234512345
1 0.39 0.25 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.70 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.01
2 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.12 0.20 0.44 0.21 0.09 0.05
3 0.19 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.13 0.07 0.25 0.41 0.21 0.06
4 0.12 0.15 0.23 0.28 0.22 0.03 0.10 0.24 0.41 0.21
5 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.23 0.45 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.24 0.67
1234512345
1 0.40 0.25 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.59 0.25 0.10 0.03 0.03
2 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.21 0.11 0.23 0.36 0.22 0.14 0.05
3 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.32 0.23 0.08
4 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.05 0.12 0.27 0.34 0.22
5 0.08 0.10 0.19 0.21 0.42 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.25 0.62
1998 quintile 1998 quintile
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that none of the measures has the minimum requirements regarded as essential (period consistency and
period invariance in particular).24
After controlling for the household characteristics, the main diagonal of the transitional matrices
becomes more prominent, meaning that less households change their decile position.  Between
1994 and 1995, 72 percent of households remained in the first quintile, and 76 percent in the fifth
quintile of the distribution.  For the middle quintile, the chance of remaining in the same rank is
below 40 percent, and the symmetry is still apparent.  The fact that controlling for the household
characteristics increases the share of households who change their rank position suggests that
factors unaccounted for are the ones that cause the mobility.  Table 7 presents the Cramer’s V
measure of association for both unconditioned (actual) and conditioned (predicted) transitional
matrices.  It shows that the association is higher for the predicted expenditure, with this
relationship declining as the time period is extended.
Table 7: Cramer’s V Measure of Association
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Year 1995 1995 1996 1996 1998 1998
1994 0.246 0.524 0.221 0.471 0.208 0.395
1995 0.269 0.508 0.228 0.406
1996 0.236 0.492
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5.  Summary and Conclusions
This paper tried to assess inequality in Russia during the process of economic transition, and to
distinguish between the expenditure mobility and expenditure instability.  There are two main
findings:  the expenditure distribution is stable in spite of the economic and political turmoil
Russia was (and still is) going through.  However, that does not imply expenditure stability.  The
mobility of households within the expenditure distribution is high.  The results were somewhat
affected by the high attrition rates, although it is hard to say whether the attrition causes the
expenditure instability was under or overestimated.25
Individuals in Russia face much economic insecurity – the median absolute annual change in
household expenditure is between 25 and 30 percent.  However, more than half the fluctuations in
household expenditure reflect measurement error or transitory shocks.  The first part of the
mobility inquiry suggested that in 1998 relative to 1994, on average, ‘rich’ were getting poorer,
while the poor were getting richer.  At the mean, ‘rich’ were losing 20 percentile points, while the
‘poor’ were gaining 20 percentile points.  But, transition matrices showed that the results based
on averages might be misleading.  There seems to be a fragment of population that is trapped in
the lowest quintile of the distribution.  After controlling for the basic household characteristics,
almost 70% of those in the first quintile in 1994 remained in it in 1995.
Some important aspects of mobility and expenditure dynamics were omitted in this paper, such as
intergenerational mobility, and wage inequality and mobility.  As Welch (1999) points out,
inequality is destructive whenever the low-wage citizen views society as unfair, when he or she
views individual efforts as not worthwhile, or when upward mobility is viewed as so unlikely that
its pursuit is not worthwhile.  It is hard to say whether the rise in inequality in Russia was
destructive without looking closely into the returns to skill in the years that followed the advant of
the transition.  Changes in inequality in an economy that is experiencing turbulent times (a sharp
decline in output and employment; high inflation, loss of markets due to the break of the Eastern
Bloc, to mention but the few) should alone merit our interest.  However, if one still needs an
excuse to look into such inequality, a number of studies suggest that the changes in inequality
may affect other aspects of an economy.  An increase in inequality may lead to less political
stability, and therefore to sub-optimal investment levels (Alesina & Perotti, 1996); higher
violence levels (Fajnzylber et. al., 1998); the emergence of an underclass (Lokshin & Popkin,
1999); and under certain conditions, reduced economic growth through its impact on individual
investment in human or physical capital (Aghion, et. al. 1999).26
Distinguishing between mobility and instability is not an easy task in a transitional economy, but
it is nonetheless a very important one.  While the high levels of mobility may indicate that even in
Russia there is a chance for an American dream, the high instability is worrisome, and may affect
the incentives of Russians to support the economic reforms, acquire human capital, and undergo
entrepreneurial efforts.  Even though Russians may accept the game of the Russian roulette that
they are caught in, the concern is that they do not find the game amusing.27
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Appendix
Permanent-Transitory Model
Define  it E  as the log of real monthly equivalent expenditure of household i in year t.  A variable can be
decomposed on its permanent, individual specific part, and transitory part, using the standard permanent-
transitory decomposition:
it i it E υ µ + = ,
Where µ i is a permanent expenditure and does not vary over time, while υ it is transitory expenditure, which
does vary over time.  The variance of the equivalent expenditure is equal to the sum of the variances of the
permanent and transitory part, since the two are not correlated:
2 2 2
it i it E υ µ σ σ σ + = .
To compute permanent and transitory log expenditure variances, I calculate for each individual the mean of
his log equivalent expenditure over all four years ( ∑
=
=
T
t
it i E
T
E
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) and deviation of his log expenditure
from his mean in each year ( . i it E E − ).
The variance of random component is calculated by computing the variance of the four random
components separately for each individual and then averaging then across individuals:
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The variance of the permanent component is then simply the difference between the log expenditure
variance and the variance of random component
2 2 2
it it i E υ µ σ σ σ − = .
The bootstrapping method is used to calculate the standard error of the variance components.30
Tables
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for the Balanced Panel and Individual Rounds
UBUBUBUB
Age 46.5 47.0 47.1 47.7 46.8 47.9 46.8 48.7
Years of education 11.2 11.0 11.0 10.8 11.1 10.9 11.1 11.0
Gender
Female 0.235 0.225 0.245 0.238 0.250 0.246 0.253 0.256
Male 0.765 0.775 0.755 0.762 0.750 0.754 0.747 0.744
Education Level
Primary and less 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.010
Incomplete Vocational and Secondary      0.230 0.239 0.293 0.294 0.272 0.272 0.249 0.251
Attended vocational               0.162 0.174 0.162 0.174 0.158 0.167 0.158 0.167
Completed Vocational          0.098 0.107 0.083 0.089 0.089 0.095 0.098 0.105
Completed Secondary                               0.145 0.148 0.128 0.127 0.137 0.137 0.147 0.148
 Technical/Nursing               0.168 0.169 0.154 0.157 0.163 0.168 0.171 0.163
University                              0.175 0.147 0.163 0.148 0.165 0.146 0.160 0.151
Graduate                          0.012 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.006
Number of children in the household
None 0.559 0.544 0.499 0.547 0.468 0.553 0.436 0.566
One 0.259 0.262 0.221 0.262 0.224 0.268 0.211 0.274
Two 0.153 0.159 0.134 0.159 0.120 0.147 0.094 0.123
Three and more 0.029 0.035 0.146 0.031 0.188 0.032 0.260 0.037
Number of elderly in the household
None 0.548 0.527 0.540 0.513 0.541 0.505 0.548 0.496
One 0.299 0.302 0.305 0.312 0.307 0.326 0.299 0.330
Two 0.147 0.166 0.149 0.170 0.145 0.161 0.142 0.163
Three and more 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.011
Number of Income Earners
None 0.055 0.040 0.042 0.036 0.042 0.039 0.039 0.051
One 0.363 0.325 0.320 0.338 0.298 0.343 0.264 0.336
Two 0.445 0.472 0.393 0.464 0.368 0.459 0.326 0.429
Three 0.109 0.125 0.096 0.125 0.097 0.118 0.098 0.129
Four and more 0.028 0.038 0.150 0.037 0.195 0.041 0.274 0.054
Household type
Single Parent 0.095 0.074 0.100 0.080 0.106 0.083 0.116 0.085
Old man 0.440 0.460 0.430 0.449 0.425 0.432 0.416 0.406
Old woman 0.016 0.011 0.017 0.013 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.017
Multiple old 0.114 0.111 0.124 0.121 0.123 0.123 0.118 0.136
Other with children 0.101 0.113 0.103 0.116 0.101 0.113 0.105 0.123
Other without children 0.234 0.232 0.225 0.221 0.228 0.233 0.227 0.233
Region
Moscow and St. Petersburg 0.099 0.059 0.089 0.059 0.079 0.059 0.070 0.059
Northern and North Western                   0.070 0.067 0.069 0.067 0.070 0.067 0.069 0.067
Central and Central Black-Earth              0.197 0.210 0.195 0.210 0.203 0.210 0.201 0.210
Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin                 0.177 0.210 0.179 0.210 0.182 0.210 0.192 0.210
North Caucasian                                   0.117 0.112 0.119 0.112 0.120 0.112 0.118 0.112
Ural                                             0.145 0.164 0.150 0.164 0.151 0.164 0.155 0.164
Western Siberian                                 0.098 0.099 0.097 0.099 0.096 0.099 0.102 0.099
Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern             0.096 0.079 0.101 0.079 0.099 0.079 0.092 0.079
Settlement type
Moscow and St. Petersburg 0.099 0.059 0.089 0.059 0.079 0.059 0.070 0.059
Urban 0.601 0.582 0.601 0.582 0.600 0.582 0.603 0.582
Semi-Urban 0.056 0.062 0.056 0.062 0.060 0.062 0.063 0.062
Rural 0.244 0.297 0.254 0.297 0.262 0.297 0.264 0.297
Number of Households 3,763 2,390 3,560 2,390 3,562 2,390 3,622 2,390
Attrition rate (compared to balanced panel)
1994 1995 1996 1998
36.5% 32.9% 32.9% 34.0%
U: Individual rounds
B: Four-year balanced panel31
Table A2:  Distribution of the Per Capita Household Expenditure
Mean Median Lg Mean Lg Var. Gini 90th-10th 50th-10th 90th-50th 75th-50th 50th-25th
1994 3931.69 2644.19 7.88 0.75 0.47 7.97 2.83 2.81 1.68 1.69
(87.63) (44.75) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.25) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
1995 3363.77 2257.30 7.73 0.73 0.47 7.79 2.77 2.82 1.69 1.64
(88.64) (37.36) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.29) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02)
1996 2939.56 1975.68 7.57 0.81 0.48 8.59 2.98 2.89 1.67 1.74
(76.98) (26.76) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.38) (0.10) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
1998 2227.62 1489.38 7.29 0.79 0.48 8.42 2.96 2.85 1.69 1.74
(62.37) (21.33) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.33) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
1994 3701.18 2580.79 7.85 0.70 0.45 7.49 2.76 2.71 1.66 1.66
(109.81) (51.35) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.33) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
1995 3172.04 2172.71 7.70 0.67 0.45 7.41 2.66 2.79 1.68 1.62
(88.81) (37.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.30) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
1996 2743.01 1908.80 7.52 0.77 0.46 8.34 2.97 2.81 1.67 1.71
(98.85) (36.83) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.35) (0.08) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03)
1998 2012.44 1444.76 7.25 0.72 0.45 7.99 2.88 2.78 1.66 1.74
(43.93) (25.34) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.40) (0.12) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04)
4 year avg. 2894.87 2230.95 7.74 0.42 0.37 5.12 2.14 2.39 1.54 1.51
(57.45) (37.87) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.19) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02)
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Table A3:  Regression Results-Change in Log Real Equivalent Expenditure
Female household head -0.033 -0.112 * -0.078
(0.041) (0.047) (0.045)
Age Groups
Age 31-50 0.072 0.021 0.080
(0.046) (0.052) (0.050)
Age 51-64 0.038 -0.042 0.075
(0.054) (0.061) (0.059)
Age 65 and older 0.004 -0.041 -0.048
(0.066) (0.074) (0.072)
Education
Technical/Voccational -0.020 0.019 0.019
(0.035) (0.039) (0.038)
Higher Education 0.092 * 0.182 ** 0.251 **
(0.045) (0.050) (0.049)
Household Composition
One child -0.042 0.027 0.107 *
(0.041) (0.046) (0.045)
Two children -0.155 ** -0.131 * -0.041
(0.050) (0.056) (0.054)
Three and more children -0.319 ** -0.166 -0.133
(0.087) (0.097) (0.095)
One elderly -0.061 -0.013 -0.052
(0.041) (0.046) (0.045)
Two elderly -0.050 -0.023 -0.092
(0.050) (0.057) (0.055)
Three and more elderly 0.167 -0.076 -0.120
1995-1994 1996-1994 1998-199432
Table A3:  Regression Results-Change in Log Real Equivalent Expenditure (cont.)
Region
Northern and North Western -0.204 * -0.249 ** -0.232 *
(0.084) (0.095) (0.092)
Central and Central Black-Earth -0.240 ** -0.361 ** -0.277 **
(0.070) (0.079) (0.076)
Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin -0.397 ** -0.502 ** -0.378 **
(0.070) (0.079) (0.077)
North Caucasian -0.207 ** -0.419 ** -0.247 **
(0.076) (0.086) (0.084)
Ural -0.304 ** -0.469 ** -0.392 **
(0.072) (0.081) (0.079)
Western Siberian -0.313 ** -0.434 ** -0.273 **
(0.078) (0.088) (0.085)
Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern -0.133 -0.340 -0.017
(0.081) (0.092) (0.089)
Initial position
1st "decile" 1.024 ** 1.236 ** 1.192 **
(0.070) (0.079) (0.077)
2nd "decile" 0.573 ** 0.694 ** 0.428 **
(0.070) (0.079) (0.076)
3rd "decile" 0.437 ** 0.629 ** 0.391 **
(0.070) (0.079) (0.076)
4the "decile" 0.269 ** 0.402 ** 0.311 **
(0.070) (0.078) (0.076)
5the "decile" 0.137 * 0.182 * 0.160 *
(0.070) (0.079) (0.076)
7th "decile" -0.010 0.031 -0.096
(0.070) (0.079) (0.076)
8th "decile" -0.094 0.025 -0.150 *
(0.070) (0.078) (0.076)
9the "decile" -0.183 ** -0.158 * -0.326 **
(0.070) (0.079) (0.076)
10th "decile" -0.382 ** -0.220 ** -0.405 **
(0.070) (0.079) (0.077)
11th "decile" -0.712 ** -0.634 ** -0.895 **
(0.071) (0.079) (0.077)
Constant 0.023 -0.129 -0.481 **
(0.091) (0.103) (0.100)
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
The dependent variable is year-to-year difference in log real equivalent expenditures.  
Omitted category: 
Household from Moscow/St. Petersburg, with a male head 15-30 years old, with secondary education , 
1995-1994 1996-1994 1998-1994
2,390 2,390 2,390
0.26 0.25 0.2833
Table A4:  Regression Results- Log Equivalent Adult Household Expenditure
Female household head -0.164 ** -0.144 ** -0.178 ** -0.190 **
(0.045) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045)
Age of the head 0.019 ** 0.009 0.011 0.012
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Age square -0.247 ** -0.132 * -0.129 -0.148 *
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Education
Technical/Voccational 0.171 ** 0.092 * 0.131 ** 0.019
(0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039)
Higher Education 0.378 ** 0.264 ** 0.342 ** 0.370 **
(0.048) (0.046) (0.051) (0.049)
Household composition
One child -0.212 ** -0.223 ** -0.128 ** -0.048
(0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.044)
Two children -0.373 ** -0.363 ** -0.253 ** -0.159 **
(0.053) (0.052) (0.057) (0.058)
Three and more children -0.678 ** -0.646 ** -0.640 ** -0.302 **
(0.093) (0.096) (0.104) (0.094)
One elderly -0.227 ** -0.163 ** -0.143 ** -0.098 *
(0.044) (0.042) (0.046) (0.045)
Two elderly -0.084 -0.097 -0.126 * -0.079
(0.054) (0.052) (0.058) (0.056)
Three and more elderly -0.321 0.061 -0.473 * -0.270
(0.232) (0.210) (0.202) (0.162)
Region
Northern and North Western 0.038 -0.182 * -0.255 ** -0.242 *
(0.092) (0.090) (0.098) (0.095)
Central and Central Black-Earth -0.199 ** -0.357 ** -0.500 ** -0.389 **
(0.076) (0.074) (0.081) (0.078)
Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin -0.329 ** -0.535 ** -0.657 ** -0.520 **
(0.076) (0.074) (0.081) (0.078)
North Caucasian -0.118 -0.250 ** -0.461 ** -0.287 **
(0.083) (0.081) (0.088) (0.086)
Ural -0.147 -0.367 ** -0.555 ** -0.464 **
(0.078) (0.077) (0.083) (0.081)
Western Siberian 0.010 -0.280 ** -0.434 ** -0.273 **
(0.085) (0.083) (0.090) (0.087)
Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern 0.141 -0.084 -0.334 ** -0.009
(0.089) (0.086) (0.094) (0.091)
Constant 8.096 ** 8.330 ** 8.157 7.718 **
(0.170) (0.170) (0.181) (0.169)
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
Ommited category: 
Moscow/St. Ptersburg household with no children and no elderly, headed by a man with secondary education
Age Square=(Age^2)/1000
0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09
2390 2390 2390 2390
1994 1995 1996 199834
Figures
Figure A1:  Lorenz Curves for Equivalent Adult Household Expenditure
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Figure A2:  Probability Density Kernel Estimates of the LEAHE, individual rounds vs. balanced
panel
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Figure A3a:  Kernel Estimates of the Distribution of the Log Expenditure Shock
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Figure A3b:  Kernel Estimates of the Distribution of the Log Expenditure Shock
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Log Expenditures Change
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
94-95 94-96 94-98THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers
The entire Working Paper Series is available at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
CURRENT AS OF 1/24/01
Publication Authors Date
No. 358 Russian Roulette-Expenditure Inequality and Instability in
Russia, 1994-1998
Branko Jovanovic Sept. 2000
No. 357 Dealing with the Bad Loans of the Chinese Banks John P. Bonin and Yiping Huang Jan. 2001
No. 356 Retail Banking in Hungary: A Foreign Affair? John P. Bonin and István Ábel Dec. 2000
No. 355 Optimal Speed of Transition: Micro Evidence from the Czech
Republic
Stepan Jurajda and Katherine
Terrell
Dec. 2000
No. 354 Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships Jody Overland, Kenneth L.
Simons and Michael Spagat
Nov. 2000
No. 353 Disintegration and Trade Jarko Fidrmuc and Jan Fidrmuc Nov. 2000
No. 352 Social Capital and Entrepreneurial Performance in Russia: A
Panel Study
Bat Batjargal Dec. 2000
No. 351 Entrepreneurial Versatility, Resources and Firm Performance in
Russia: A Panel Study
Bat Batjargal Dec. 2000
No. 350 The Dynamics of Entrepreneurial Networks in a Transitional
Economy: The Case of Russia
Bat Batjargal Dec. 2000
No. 349 R&D and Technology Spillovers via FDI: Innovation and
Absorptive Capacity
Yuko Kinoshita Nov. 2000
No. 348  Microeconomic aspects of Economic Growth in Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 1950-2000
Sergei Guriev and Barry W. Ickes Nov. 2000
No. 347  Effective versus Statutory Taxation: Measuring Effective Tax
Administration in Transition Economies
Mark E. Schaffer and Gerard
Turley
Nov. 2000
No. 346  Objectives and Constraints of Entrepreneurs: Evidence from
Small and Medium Size Enterprises in Russia and Bulgaria
Francesca Pissarides, Miroslav
Singer and Jan Svejnar
Oct. 2000
No. 345  Corruption and Anticorruption in the Czech Republic Lubomír Lízal and Evžen
Kočenda
Oct. 2000
No. 344  The Effects of Direct Foreign Investment on Domestic Firms Jozef Konings Oct. 2000
No. 343 On the Identification of Relative Wage Rigidity Dynamics Patrick A. Puhani Oct. 2000
No. 342  The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Transition
Economies
Alan A. Bevan and Saul Estrin Oct. 2000
No. 341  The Global Spread of Stock Exchanges, 1980-1998 Klaus Weber and Gerald F. Davis Nov. 2000
No. 340  The Costs and Benefits of Euro-isation in Central-Eastern
Europe Before or Instead of EMU Membership
D. Mario Nuti Oct. 2000
No. 339  Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia Sergei Guriev, Igor Makarov and
Mathilde Maurel
Sept. 2000
No. 338  Firm Performance and the Political Economy of Corporate
Governance: Survey Evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and
Slovenia
Patrick Paul Walsh and Ciara
Whela
July 2000
No. 337  Investment and Instability Nauro F. Campos and Jeffrey B.
Nugent
May 2000
No. 336  The Evolution of the Insurance Sector in Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
Robert B.K. Pye Aug. 2000
No. 335  Institutional Technology and the Chains of Trust: Capital
Markets and Privatization in Russia and the Czech Republic
Bruce Kogut and Andrew Spicer Aug. 2000
No. 334  The Evolution of Market Integration in Russia Daniel Berkowitz and David N.
DeJong
Aug. 2000
No. 333  Efficiency and Market Share in Hungarian Corporate Sector László Halpern and Gábor Kőrösi July 2000The entire Working Paper Series is available at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 332  Search-Money-and-Barter Models of Financial Stabilization S.I. Boyarchenko and S.Z.
Levendorskii
July 2000
No. 331  Worker Training in a Restructuring Economy: Evidence from
the Russian Transition
Mark C. Berger, John S. Earle
and Klara Z. Sabirianova
Aug. 2000
No. 330  Economic Development in Palanpur 1957-1993: A Sort of
Growth
Peter Lanjouw Aug. 2000
No. 329  Trust, Organizational Controls, Knowledge Acquisition from
the Foreign Parents, and Performance in Vietnamese International Joint
Ventures
Marjorie A. Lyles, Le Dang
Doanh, and Jeffrey Q. Barden
June 2000
No. 328  Comparative Advertising in the Global Marketplace:  The
Effects of Cultural Orientation on Communication
Zeynep Gürhan-Canli and
Durairaj Maheswaran
Aug. 2000
No. 327  Post Privatization Enterprise Restructuring Morris Bornstein July 2000
No. 326  Who is Afraid of Political Instability? Nauro F. Campos and Jeffrey B.
Nugent
July 2000
No. 325  Business Groups, the Financial Market and Modernization Raja Kali June 2000
No. 324  Restructuring with What Success?  A Case Study of Russian
Firms
Susan Linz July 2000
No. 323  Priorities and Sequencing in Privatization: Theory and
Evidence from the Czech Republic
Nandini Gupta, John C. Ham and
Jan Svejnar
May 2000
No. 322  Liquidity, Volatility, and Equity Trading Costs Across
Countries and Over Time
Ian Domowitz, Jack Glen and
Ananth Madhavan
Mar. 2000
No. 321  Equilibrium Wage Arrears: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis of Institutional Lock-In
John S. Earle and Klara Z.
Sabirianova
Oct. 2000
No. 320 Rethinking Marketing Programs for Emerging Markets Niraj Dawar and Amitava
Chattopadhyay
June 2000
No. 319 Public Finance and Low Equilibria in Transition Economies:
the Role of Institutions
Daniel Daianu and Radu
Vranceanu
June 2000
No. 318 Some Econometric Evidence on the Effectiveness of Active
Labour Market Programmes in East Germany
Martin Eichler and Michael
Lechner
June 2000
No. 317 A Model of Russia’s “Virtual Economy” R.E Ericson and B.W Ickes May 2000
No. 316 Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial
Crises
Haizhou Huang and Chenggang
Xu
Mar. 2000
No. 315 Privatization versus Regulation in Developing Economies: The
Case of West African Banks
Jean Paul Azam, Bruno Biais, and
Magueye Dia
Feb. 2000
No. 314 Is Life More Risky in the Open? Household Risk-Coping and
the Opening of China’s Labor Markets
John Giles Apr. 2000
No. 313 Networks, Migration and Investment: Insiders and Outsiders in
Tirupur’s Production Cluster
Abhijit Banerjee and Kaivan
Munshi
Mar. 2000
No. 312 Computational Analysis of the Impact on India of the Uruguay
Round and the Forthcoming WTO Trade Negotiations
Rajesh Chadha, Drusilla K.
Brown, Alan V. Deardorff and
Robert M. Stern
Mar. 2000
No. 311 Subsidized Jobs for Unemployed Workers in Slovakia Jan. C. van Ours May 2000
No. 310 Determinants of Managerial Pay in the Czech Republic Tor Eriksson, Jaromir Gottvald
and Pavel Mrazek
May 2000
No. 309 The Great Human Capital Reallocation: An Empirical Analysis
of Occupational Mobility in Transitional Russia
Klara Z. Sabirianova Oct. 2000
No. 308 Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina
Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard
Feb. 2000
No. 307 Community Participation, Teacher Effort, and Educational
Outcome: The Case of El Salvador’s EDUCO Program
Yasuyuki Sawada Nov. 1999
No. 306 Gender Wage Gap and Segregation in Late Transition Stepan Jurajda May 2000
No. 305 The Gender Pay Gap in the Transition from Communism:
Some Empirical Evidence
Andrew Newell and Barry Reilly May 2000
No. 304 Post-Unification Wage Growth  in East Germany Jennifer Hunt Nov. 1998
No. 303 How Does Privatization Affect Workers?  The Case of the
Russian Mass Privatization Program
Elizabeth Brainerd May 2000The entire Working Paper Series is available at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 302 Liability for Past Environmental Contamination and
Privatization
Dietrich Earnhart Mar. 2000
No. 301 Varieties, Jobs and EU Enlargement Tito Boeri and Joaquim Oliveira
Martins
May 2000
No. 300 Employer Size Effects in Russia Todd Idson Apr. 2000
No. 299 Information Complements, Substitutes, and Strategic Product
Design
Geoffrey G. Parker and Marshall
W. Van Alstyne
Mar. 2000
No. 298 Markets, Human Capital, and Inequality: Evidence from Rural
China
Dwayne Benjamin, Loren Brandt,
Paul Glewwe, and Li Guo
May 2000
No. 297 Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis Simon Johnson, Peter Boone,
Alasdair Breach, and Eric
Friedman
Nov. 1999
No. 296 Competition and Firm Performance: Lessons from Russia J. David Brown and John S. Earle Mar. 2000
No. 295 Wage Determination in Russia: An Econometric Investigation Peter J. Luke and Mark E.
Schaffer
Mar. 2000
No. 294: Can Banks Promote Enterprise Restructuring?: Evidence From
a Polish Bank’s Experience
John P. Bonin and Bozena Leven Mar. 2000
No. 293: Why do Governments Sell Privatised Companies Abroad? Bernardo Bortolotti, Marcella
Fantini and Carlo Scarpa
Mar. 2000
No. 292: Going Public in Poland: Case-by-Case Privatizations, Mass
Privatization and Private Sector Initial Public Offerings
Wolfgang Aussenegg Dec. 1999
No. 291: Institutional Technology and the Chains of Trust: Capital
Markets and Privatization in Russia and the Czech Republic
Bruce Kogut and Andrew Spicer Mar. 1999
No. 290: Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Effect of Reputation Jenny Corbett and Janet Mitchell Jan. 2000
No. 289: Do Active Labor Market Policies Help Unemployed Workers
to Find and Keep Regular Jobs?
Jan C. van Ours Feb. 2000
No. 288: Consumption Patterns of the New Elite in Zimbabwe Russell Belk Feb. 2000
No. 287: Barter in Transition Economies: Competing Explanations
Confront Ukranian Data
Dalia Marin, Daniel Kaufmann
and Bogdan Gorochowskij
Jan. 2000
No. 286: The Quest for Pension Reform: Poland’s Security through
Diversity
Marek Góra and Michael
Rutkowski
Jan. 2000
No. 285: Disorganization and Financial Collapse Dalia Marin and Monika
Schnitzer
Oct. 1999
No. 284: Coordinating Changes in M-form and U-form Organizations Yingyi Qian, Gérard Roland and
Chenggang Xu
May 1999
No. 283: Why Russian Workers Do Not Move: Attachment of Workers
Through In-Kind Payments
Guido Friebel and Sergei Guriev Oct. 1999
No. 282: Lessons From Fiascos in Russian Corporate Governance Merritt B. Fox and Michael A.
Heller
Oct. 1999
No. 281: Income Distribution and Price Controls: Targeting a Social
Safety Net During Economic Transition
Michael Alexeev and James
Leitzel
Mar. 1999
No. 280: Starting Positions, Reform Speed, and Economic Outcomes in
Transitioning Economies
William Hallagan and Zhang Jun Jan. 2000
No. 279 : The Value of Prominent Directors Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark
Ramseyer
Oct. 1999
No. 278: The System Paradigm János Kornai Apr. 1998
No. 277: The Developmental Consequences of Foreign Direct
Investment in the Transition from Socialism to Capitalism: The
Performance of Foreign Owned Firms in Hungary
Lawrence Peter King Sept. 1999
No. 276: Stability and Disorder: An Evolutionary Analysis of Russia’s
Virtual Economy
Clifford Gaddy and Barry W.
Ickes
Nov. 1999
No. 275: Limiting Government Predation Through Anonymous
Banking: A Theory with Evidence from China.
Chong-En Bai, David D. Li,
Yingyi Qian and Yijiang Wang
July 1999
No. 274: Transition with Labour Supply Tito Boeri Dec. 1999
No. 273: Sectoral Restructuring and Labor Mobility: A Comparative
Look at the Czech Republic
Vit Sorm and Katherine Terrell Nov. 1999The entire Working Paper Series is available at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 272: Published in: Journal of Comparative Economics “Returns to
Human Capital Under the Communist Wage Grid and During the
Transition to a Market Economy” Vol. 27, pp. 33-60 1999.
Daniel Munich, Jan Svejnar and
Katherine Terrell
Oct. 1999
No. 271: Barter in Russia: Liquidity Shortage Versus Lack of
Restructuring
Sophie Brana and Mathilde
Maurel
June 1999
No. 270: Tests for Efficient Financial Intermediation with Application to
China
Albert Park and Kaja Sehrt Mar. 1999
No. 269a: Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went
Wrong?
Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman
and Anna Tarassova
May 2000
No. 269: Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went
Wrong?
Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman
and Anna Tarassova
Sept. 1999
No. 268: Are Russians Really Ready for Capitalism? Susan Linz Sept. 1999
No. 267: Do Stock Markets Promote Economic Growth? Randall K. Filer, Jan Hanousek
and Nauro Campos
Sept. 1999
No. 266: Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate
Governance
Arnoud W.A Boot and Jonathan
R. Macey
Sept. 1999
No. 265: When the Future is not What it Used to Be: Lessons from the
Western European Experience to Forecasting Education and Training in
Transitional Economies
Nauro F. Campos, Gerard
Hughes, Stepan Jurajda, and
Daniel Munich
Sept. 1999
No. 264: The Institutional Foundation of Foreign-Invested Enterprises
(FIEs) in China
Yasheng Huang Sept. 1999
No. 263: The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications
for Transition and Developing Countries
Erik Berglof and Ernst-Ludwig
von Thadden
June 1999
No. 262: Law Enforcement and Transition Gerard Roland and Thierry
Verdier
May 1999
No. 261: Soft Budget Constraints, Pecuniary Externality, and the Dual
Track System
Jiahua Che June 2000
No. 260: Missing Market in Labor Quality: The Role of Quality Markets
in Transition
Gary H. Jefferson July 1999
No. 259: Do Corporate Global Environmental Standards in Emerging
Markets Create or Destroy Market Value
Glen Dowell, Stuart Hart and
Bernard Yeung
June 1999
No. 258: Public Training and Outflows from Unemployment Patrick A. Puhani June 1999
No. 257: Ownership Versus Environment: Why are Public Sector Firms
Inefficient?
Ann P. Bartel and Ann E.
Harrison
June 1999
No. 256: Taxation and Evasion in the Presence of Exortion by
Organized Crime
Michael Alexeev, Eckhard Janeba
and Stefan Osborne
Nov. 1999
No. 255: Revisiting Hungary’s Bankruptcy Episode John P. Bonin and Mark E.
Schaffer
Sept. 1999
No. 254: FDI in Emerging Markets: A Home-Country View Marina v.N Whitman June 1999
No. 253: The Asian Financial Crisis: What Happened, and What is to be
Done
Jeffrey D. Sachs and Wing Thye
Woo
Jan. 1999
No. 252: Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman
Sept. 1999
No. 251: Consumer Behavior Research in Emerging Consumer Markets:
the Case of the Optimum Stimulation Level in South Africa
Jan-Benedict E. M. Steenkamp
and Steven M. Burgess
Sept. 1999
No. 250: Property Rights Formation and the Organization of Exchange
and Production in Rural China
Matthew A. Turner, Loren
Brandt, and Scott Rozelle
July 1998
No. 249: Impacts of the Indonesian Economic Crisis: Price Changes and
the Poor
James Levinsohn, Steven Berry,
and Jed Friedman
June 1999
No. 248: Internal Barriers in the Transition of Enterprises from Central
Plan to Market
Charalambos Vlachoutsicos July 1999
No. 247: Spillovers from Multinationals in Developing Countries: the
Mechanisms at Work
Richard E. Caves June 1999
No. 246: Dynamism and Inertia on the Russian Labour Market: A
Model of Segmentation
Irena Grosfeld, Claudia Senik-
Leygonie, Thierry Verdier, Stanislav
Kolenikov and Elena Paltseva
May 1999